The aim of this paper is to examine the degree to which the determinants of SMEs' capital structures differ between European countries. The study is based on data for four thousand SMEs, five hundred from each of eight European countries. Regressions were run using short-term and long-term debt as dependent variables and profitability, growth, asset structure, size and age as independent variables. A key feature of this paper is the use of restricted and unrestricted regressions to isolate the country-effect from the firm-specificeffect. The results show that variations are likely to be due to country differences as well as firm-specific ones.
INTRODUCTION
An important question in finance is the extent to which financial behaviour is affected by country-specific factors. There has been a great deal of research in the area of international accounting and finance. This has included work on capital structure (Remmers et al., 1974; Rajan and Zingales, 1995; and Prasad et al., 1996) , and on the international differences in capital structure norms (Aggarwal, 1981) , the effect of national culture on the capital structure of firms (Park, 1998) , and the relationship between capital structure and ownership and governance structures (Kester, 1986; and Thompson and Wright, 1995) . These studies have covered countries in the European Union (Prasad et al., 1996) , the USA and Japan (Kester, 1986) , the "G-7" countries (Rajan and Zingales, 1995) and others (Park, 1998) . The studies have derived hypotheses from various sources such as Hofstede's classification of national culture using the dimensions of Power Distance, Uncertainty Avoidance, Individualism-Collectivism and Masculinity-Femininity (Hofstede, 1980) . Another theory is premised on differences, especially in corporate governance, between English speaking counties with a tradition of liberalism and capitalism, and other countries that result in differences in capital structure (Thompson and Wright, 1995) .
The results of the above research have been mixed in terms of establishing consistent differences between countries in the influences on their capital structures. A reason for this could be that whilst capital structures vary from country to country this might be due to variations in the determinants of capital structure, that operate at the firm level, rather than real differences between countries. For example, firms in a particular country may have higher debt levels than another but this may be because they include a higher proportion of newer firms that need to borrow more. This is similar to the argument proposed by Myers (1984) that differences in capital structure between firms in different industries are likely to be due to firm-specific attributes rather than industry differences.
A major gap in the research has been in the consideration of international differences in capital structures and their determinants for small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs). This may be due to several reasons but one must almost certainly be lack of data for unlisted firms.
The lack of research using SME data is a significant gap because it is likely that capital structures of SMEs, that have no stock market listing, will demonstrate greater inter-country variability than will large firms. Unlike listed firms, SMEs will not have access to international capital markets and not be subject to international scrutiny and norms.
Research on capital structure has considered the relative merits of pecking order theory versus static trade-off theory (Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1999; and Watson and Wilson, 2002) , pecking order theory and the managerial hypothesis (Griner and Gordon, 1995) and agency and tax considerations (Walsh and Ryan, 1997) . A related issue is how well the pecking order theory explains dividend policy (Adedeji, 1998) . The determinants of capital structure for UK firms have been investigated by Bennett and Donnelly (1993), Ozkan (2001) and, for UK SMEs by Chittenden et al. (1996) and Jordan et al. (1998) . The aim of this paper is to build on previous research by looking at differences in capital structure for European SMEs in a way that will establish whether any differences are due to country-specific factors or to differences between countries in firm-specific factors.
Our hypotheses with regard to individual determinants of SME capital structure are identified below. The hypothesis with regard to international differences is, in the null form, that national differences have no direct effect on SME capital structure. That is to say differences in SME capital structures between countries are due to firm-specific variations in determinants not country-specific ones. The section that follows will develop our hypotheses and explain our choice of variables, with reference to relevant literature, and discuss their relationship with capital structure. In subsequent sections we present descriptive data on all variables, describe our method of analysis and present our results and conclusions.
DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESES
In the seminal work of Modigliani and Miller (1958) the values of firms would be unaffected by their capital structure. When corporation taxes and the tax deductibility of interest payments are taken into account (Modigliani and Miller, 1963) , firms maximise their values by maximising the use of debt. The "static trade-off" theory (Myers, 1984) modifies the latter by trading-off the benefits of debt against the costs from the increased likelihood of bankruptcy resulting from higher levels of debt.
The Pecking Order Theory (POT) was first proposed by Myers (1984) , drawing on the work of Jensen and Meckling (1976) on agency theory, Myers and Majluf (1984) on information asymmetry and of Ross (1977) on signalling theory. Its particular relevance to small and medium sized firms has been emphasised by Ang (1991) , Holmes and Kent (1991) and Cosh and Hughes (1994) . The thrust of POT is that firms will have a preference (pecking) order for different types of finance, reflecting their relative costs with the ranking being: retained profits, debt and external equity. This, in turn, reflects the relationship of the firms with their different suppliers of capital in terms of agency, information asymmetry and signalling considerations.. Problems arise in raising debt capital but even more in raising external equity hence its being ranked last. However, Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) do not claim that the POT is the whole story and point out that actual financing decisions reflect many motives, forces and constraints.
Information asymmetry and signalling costs play a large part in borrowing and lending decisions and will be lower the less arms length the relationship between banks and their business customers and will be higher the greater the tradition of secrecy, even duplicity, of business decision-makers in their attitude towards outsiders to their firms. Both factors may vary between countries. Moreover, even the reliance on banks for external finance may vary with the size of countries' informal capital markets. In societies in which loans and equity can be readily raised from friends and relatives there will be less need to look to banks for finance and, therefore, to face the costs associated with principal-agent relationships.
Variables which have been included in previous empirical studies (Chittenden et al., 1996; Jordan et al, 1998; and Ozcan 2001) and which can be used for an inter-country comparison are profitability, growth, asset structure, size and age. With regard to profitability, it is assumed that internally generated funds are preferred to externally generated funds and so profitability will be negatively correlated with the amount borrowed by firms in both the long and short-term. In other words, a firm which can generate more earnings will borrow less, all things being equal (Adedeji, 1998) .
Growth is likely to put a strain on retained earnings and push the firm into borrowing.
However, as Myers (1977) has argued, growth opportunities can produce moral hazard situations and small-scale entrepreneurs have an incentive to take risks to grow. The benefits of this growth, if realised, will not be enjoyed by lenders who will only recover the amount of their loans, resulting in a clear agency problem which will be reflected in increased costs of long-term debt which can be mitigated by increased use of short-term debt.
The willingness of banks to provide long-term debt will be constrained by the possibility that it will not be recovered. As argued above principal-agent relationships may differ between countries but, nevertheless it would be surprising if increases in collateral were not welcomed by lenders within even cultures in which the nature of principal-agent relationships were of the most benign form. Hence our expectation is firstly that the amount of long-term debt will be correlated to asset structure (the proportion of assets that are fixed) that can be provided as collateral. And secondly, on the assumption that the length of loan is likely to be matched to the length of life of assets used as collateral (Myers, 1977) , that long-term debt will be increased at the expense of short-term where long-term assets are available.
With regard to size, because much of the data which small firms will supply to banks, in their applications for loans, will not be readily verifiable the problem of information asymmetry that they face will be particularly acute. Even in the absence of this asymmetry, lending to small firms will represent a significant risk because of the strong negative correlation between firm size and the probability of insolvency (Berryman, 1982) . This is partly the result of the limited portfolios of management skills suggested by Hall (1995) and partly the result of the attitudes of financial institutions towards small firms. Because of these factors, and because of the fixed transaction costs of securing long-term debt, we would expect smaller firms to have more problems raising long-term debt and so long-term debt would be positively related to firm size. In the absence of long-term debt, smaller firms would make more use of short-term debt and so this would be negatively related to size.
With regard to age, our hypothesis is that the older a firm is, the more it is able to accumulate funds and the less it will need to borrow either long-term or short-term. In other words, a new firm will not have had time to retain funds and may be forced to borrow. Consequently age is likely to be negatively related to both short-term and long-term debt.
To summarise; if there were no country-specific influences on capital structure we would expect the following hypothesis to be not rejected and the strength of relationships to be uniform across countries:-H 1a profit will be negatively related to long-term debt H 1b profit will be negatively related to short-term debt H 2a growth will be negatively related to long-term debt H 2b growth will be positively related to short-term debt H 3a asset structure will be positively related to long-term debt H 3b asset structure will be negatively related to short-term debt H 4a size will be positively related to long-term debt H 4b size will be negatively related to short-term debt H 5a age will be negatively related to long-term debt H 5b age will be negatively related to short-term debt 3. METHODOLOGY Our study is based on financial data for four thousand, incorporated SMEs, five hundred each from eight countries: Belgium, Germany, Spain, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and the UK. An SME was defined as having fewer than 200 employees. The data were supplied by Dun and Bradstreet for 1995. Because of variation in lags in reporting for the various countries, the complete set of data for all countries was not available until several years later.
The year involved (1995) was the same for all countries and corresponds to the period reported for several, complementary studies recently published in this journal (Jordan et al., 1998; Ozkan, 2001; and Watson and Wilson, 2002) .
All of the variables used in the study are based on book value in line with the argument by Myers (1984) that book values are proxies for the value of assets in place. Following Remmers et al. (1974) , the two dependent variables were: -Short Term Debt Ratio (STD) = short-term debt to total assets -Long Term Debt Ratio (LTD) = long-term debt to total assets Short-term debt is defined as the portion of the company's total debt repayable within one year. This includes bank overdraft, bank loans payable within a year and other current liabilities. Long-term debt is the company's total debt repayable beyond one year. This includes long-term bank loans and other long-term liabilities repayable beyond one year such as directors' loans, hire purchase and leasing obligations. Total debt has not been considered since others (Van der Wijst and Thurik, 1993; and Chittenden et al., 1996) have shown that total debt masks two opposite effects for long-term and short-term debt for some of the explanatory valuables; in this study these would be asset structure, size and growth. Our The use of fixed assets as a measure of collateral can be disputed since it does not capture the use of private collateral provided by the owner, which has been shown by Reid and Jacobson (1988) to be the most important source of collateral for smaller companies. However, they also showed that fixed assets were commonly used as collateral and certainly fixed assets would appear empirically to be strongly related to capital structure (Chittenden et al., 1996; and Jordan et al., 1998) .
The correlation matrix did not suggest a high degree of first order collinearity between the explanatory variables. In any case multi-collinearity produces estimates that are inefficient but unbiased (Maddala, 1988 p 226-27) . This inefficiency reduces with sample size and a sample of 4,000 would seem likely to provide sufficient degrees of freedom for this inefficiency to be fairly minimal, as is suggested by the generally low standards errors in our results.
The statistical methods closest to those applied in this paper are cross-sectional analyses of the determinants of debt ratios: Kester (1986) , Friend and Lang (1988) , Chittenden et al. (1996) , Michaelas et al. (1999) and Hall et al. (2000) . These cross-sectional analyses have generally been set up as linear regression models with a leverage measure (usually total debt to book value of assets) as the dependent variable. Explanatory data apart from age have been drawn from income statements and balance sheets. We use regression analysis to test the hypotheses discussed above by means of employing various independent variables, which are regressed against the two measures of leverage.
To determine whether there is any country effect an F test was applied to the difference in the residual sum of squares (RSS) of a restricted and an unrestricted model. In the former our dependent variables were regressed against profitability, growth, asset structure, size and age.
The unrestricted model included these variables and both country constant dummies and country slope dummies for each of the explanatory variables, an addition of seven constant and thirty-five slope dummies. Establishing for which variables their impact on long-and/or short-term debt varied between countries was achieved through comparison of the RSS of the unrestricted model with that of five restricted models in which the dummies of each variable were omitted respectively. The F test takes the form (Gujurati, 1995): Table I shows that the proportion of total assets consisting of short-term debt was between 45 and 50 per cent for most countries with Italy (63%) and Germany (38%) the outliers. Greater variability was displayed with respect to long-term debt, with Germany the most heavily reliant (28%), and the Netherlands (2%) hardly at all. Table 2 provides details of the variables we hypothesise will influence the levels of short-run and long-term debt. Considerable variation is apparent, from Table 3 we report the results from the two completely restricted models (LTD and STD).
(i) Leverage ratios and values of determinants
Our hypotheses are that profitability will be negatively related to LTD and STD. Our results in Table 3 are consistent with the latter but whilst the coefficient in the LTD model is negative it is of negligible statistical significance. Similarly the positive and highly significant coefficient on growth in the STD model is consistent with our hypothesis but its counterpart in the LTD model is positive rather than negative (but lacks statistical significance). Contrary to the theorising, age is positively related to LTD but is not significant. Otherwise the signs are as hypothesised and the coefficients statistically significant. Asset structure and size would appear to be positively related to LTD and negatively to STD, and age negatively related to STD.
Table 3
Completely Restricted Models 
(ii) Country-specific versus firm-specific effects
We can see from tables 1, 2 and 3 that there is variation in LTD and STD between countries and variation in the determinants between countries. What is not so obvious is whether the differences in capital structure are due to differences in determinants or are due to other, Where m = 8; n = 3,951; k = 40.
The F-statistic follows the F distribution with m, (n-k) degrees of freedom: F (0.05)(8, 3911) = 1.88 * Significant at 0.05level of confidence country-specific, factors. The results in Table 4 address this. Table 4 shows that when the RSS of the restricted LTD model is compared to that of the unrestricted model, the resulting F-statistic of 113.99 is highly significant. The same can be said of the comparison between the restricted and unrestricted STD models (F-statistic = 59.50). Hence it would seem safe to conclude that differences in average long and short-term debt are not simply a reflection of difference in average levels of our explanatory variables. The nature of the relationship for all but one of the variables (growth for STD) varies between countries.
(iii) Country differences
Having established that the differences between countries cannot all be explained by differences in the determinants of capital structure, it is useful to consider, further, the variations between countries. Tables 5 and 6 show the results for the individual eight countries for LTD and STD. From Table 5 , LTD, it can be seen that, for profitability, Belgium and Portugal have statistically significant results consistent with the hypothesis for profitability whilst other countries do not. This suggests that in these countries SMEs rely a great deal on internally generated funds. For growth, no countries have statistically significant results in the hypothesised direction. The only significant result for growth, for Spain, is in the opposite direction to that hypothesised. For all countries, asset structure is positively and significantly related to LTD. The strongest relationship is for the UK, Belgium, Spain and Italy. In these countries, in particular, the availability of collateral seems to be very important in raising LTD. The results for size, are in the hypothesised direction and significant for Spain, the UK and the Netherlands. This suggests that in these countries size matters when it comes to raising LTD. For age, only the UK has a significant result consistent with that hypothesised and Spain has a significant result in the opposite direction and the rest are not significant. This suggests that SMEs in the UK rely on their own resources by accumulating internal funds.
From Table 6 , STD, it can be seen that, for profitability, the UK, Italy, Germany and Belgium have statistically significant results as hypothesised. This suggests that, in these countries, profitable SMEs rely more on retained profits. For growth, the UK, Portugal and Italy have statistically significant results in line with the hypothesis. This implies that in these countries lenders are less concerned about moral hazard for short-term lending. Asset structure is statistically significant for all countries, in the hypothesised direction, with the strongest correlations for Spain and the UK. This strongly confirms the notion that SMEs and their lenders "match" short-term assets to STD because long-term assets have been pledged for LTD. For size, whilst most of the results are in the hypothesised (negative) direction the relationship is only statistically significant for Spain and the Netherlands. Spain, the UK and
Italy have significant results, in the hypothesised direction, for age again suggesting reliance on internally generated funds for the UK.
Overall, the country that seems to best fit the hypotheses, for both LTD and STD but particularly the latter, is the UK followed by Spain and Italy. Whether a good fit with the hypotheses is desirable is debatable since this paints a picture of what might normally be considered market imperfections. That is to say, firms have to rely on their own resources and are only able to borrow if they have collateral. This is a far cry from the notion of resources flowing to where they make the best return that in turn implies an emphasis on profitability and growth. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The above analysis shows that there are variations in both SME capital structure and the determinants of capital structure between the countries surveyed. The hypotheses appear to hold up reasonably well as overall explanations with that for collateral being the strongest and that for growth being the weakest (consistent with Jordan et al., 1998) . However, it becomes clear that the hypotheses do not explain everything in terms of SME capital structure since there are variations in the effects of the determinants on capital structure between countries. The variations could well be due to differences in attitudes to borrowing, disclosure requirements, relationships with banks, taxation and other national economic, social and cultural differences. These, in turn, are likely to be related to different levels of agency, information asymmetry and signalling costs between countries. Further research can provide more explanations by considering additional country-specific variables that determine SME capital structure.
